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Risk and preference is often modeled using linear pre-
visions and linear orders. Some more expressive models
use sets of probabilities, lower previsions, or partial or-
ders (see, e.g., Seidenfeld et al., 1990; Walley, 2000) and
can also deal with uncertainty. In the discussion of these
more expressive models, alternative representations in
terms of sets of so-called acceptable, favorable, or desir-
able gambles appear (cf. Seidenfeld et al., 1990; Walley,
2000). Such ‘sets of gambles’-based models are attrac-
tive because of their geometric nature.
We generalize these ‘sets of gambles’-based models by
considering a pair of sets, one with accepted gambles
and one with rejected gambles. We develop a frame-
work based on a small but powerful axiom schema and
present two instantiations of this schema.
Accepting & Rejecting Gambles Consider an
agent faced with uncertainty and risk, formalized us-
ing a linear space of gambles. We envisage an elicitation
procedure where the agent is asked to state whether
she would accept a gamble—and its possibly negative
outcome—, reject it—if she considers it unreasonable
to accept—, or remain uncommitted.
The agent’s set of acceptable gambles together with
the set of gambles she rejects form her assessment.
In terms of statements, a gamble can fall into one
of four categories: only accepted, only rejected, unre-
solved—neither accepted nor rejected—, or confusing—
both accepted and rejected.
Axiom: No Confusion We judge confusion to be a
situation that has to be avoided.
Axiom template: Background Model Per prob-
lem domain, a set of acceptable gambles and a set of re-
jected gambles can be fixed; these form the background
model, which has to be combined with the agent’s own
assessment.
Axiom template: Deductive Closure The prob-
lem domain’s assumptions about the nature of the gam-
ble payoffs—typically about the utility in which these
are expressed—determines a deductive extension rule
for accepted gambles. Starting from an assessment, this
rule generates a deductively closed assessment.
Axiom: No Limbo Deductive Closure does have
more of an impact than is apparent at first sight: An
unresolved gamble may, were it accepted, cause con-
fusion after applying deductive extension. We say that
such unresolved gambles are in limbo, as they can only
be rejected without leading to confusion. To obtain a
model, the gambles in the limbo of a deductively closed
assessment are therefore rejected.
Instantiations Consider the case where (i) the back-
ground model is defined by accepting uniformly non-
negative gambles and rejecting those that are uniformly
negative, and (ii) gambles are assumed to be expressed
in a linear utility, so that deductive extension coincides
with taking the positive linear hull. Then our axiom
schema generates a theory that generalizes Walley’s
(1991) theory of imprecise probability.
If instead we take the convex hull operation as the
deductive extension—allowing some forms of nonlinear
utility—our axiom schema generates a theory that gen-
eralizes Föllmer and Schied’s (2002) theory of convex
risk measures and Pelessoni and Vicig’s (2005) imprecise
probabilistic reformulation thereof.
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